PromethEUs Conference | SHAPING EUROPE’S DIGITAL FUTURE: A Blueprint for the EU’s Next Digital Decade

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The Institute for Competitiveness (I-Com), on behalf of PromethEUs, invites you to an insightful conference on the future of Europe’s digital transformation. This event will take place on Monday, 9 December 2024, at the European Parliament from 18:00 to 19:30 CET.

The conference will mark the launch of our latest position paper, which outlines digital priorities for the EU’s next mandate. Policymakers, experts, and stakeholders will discuss strategies to strengthen EU competitiveness, foster innovation, and enhance digital transformation in the second half of the Digital Decade.

Key topics will include:

  • Regulatory frameworks for a resilient digital economy,
  • Investment strategies to boost innovation,
  • The role of SMEs and digital diplomacy in shaping Europe’s digital future.

This is a unique opportunity to engage with leading experts and gain actionable insights into the EU’s digital agenda.

To enter the parliament you need a valid pass. If do not have that, please fill out ALL the details below to ensure entry to the event.

If you already have a valid pass, you do not need to fill out all the details in the form below. Simply register your attendance.

REGISTER HERE

PromethEUs Policy Breakfast – Digital Priorities for The New EU Mandate  

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On November 6th, PromethEUs held a policy breakfast in Brussels, bringing together experts and EU policymakers to discuss Europe’s digital priorities. The event included a presentation of the latest PromethEUs publication, which outlines strategic digital priorities essential for enhancing EU competitiveness and bridging gaps with global leaders. The discussion covered crucial areas such as digital innovation, regulatory obstacles that need to be addressed, and the resilience of Europe’s digital economy.

Our distinguished speakers included: MEP João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Aikaterini Beli, Daniel Friedlaender, Antonio Grasso, Guido Lobrano, Dan Nechita, Carlos Romero Duplá, and Pinar Serdengecti.

A key message from MEP João Cotrim De Figueiredo: “We have a clear understanding of Europe’s digital needs, now, we must gather the political will to act decisively.” This gathering underscored the need for robust digital frameworks and policies to support EU competitiveness in a rapidly advancing global digital landscape.

 

PromethEUs Policy Event: Digital Priorities for the EU 2024-2029 – Strengthening The Single Market and Reviving Competitiveness

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The PromethEUs network successfully organised the policy event titled “Digital Priorities for the EU 2024-2029: Strengthening the Single Market and Reviving Competitiveness.” This event took place on Wednesday, 23 October 2024, from 12:00 to 13:30 CET in Madrid.

About the Conference:

This significant gathering provided a platform for presenting PromethEUs’ policy recommendations on digital priorities, addressing current challenges in EU digital competitiveness. Discussions underscored the vital role of a fully functioning Digital Single Market to drive innovation and secure the EU’s position on the global stage.

Keynote speakers, including influential policymakers and industry leaders, discussed strategies to bridge the digital divide between the EU and other major economies. They emphasized the need for EU cohesion in creating a more unified and resilient digital ecosystem.

Main Takeaways:

The event underscored the need for bold digital reforms to elevate EU competitiveness, particularly in AI, data governance, and cybersecurity.

Public-private collaboration emerged as a central theme, with participants advocating joint efforts to meet Europe’s future digital demands. Specific points included the necessity of interoperable digital ecosystems and streamlining regulatory frameworks to allow greater ease of operation for businesses within the EU.

Outcome from the discussion: One prominent insight was the call to establish an EU-wide Digital Sovereignty Framework. This framework would aim to harmonize regulations across member states, providing clearer guidelines for digital infrastructure investment. Industry representatives showed strong support, advocating for public-private partnerships to advance these initiatives.

PromethEUs also presented its position paper, “Digital for Growth: Strengthening the Single Market and Reviving EU Competitiveness,” which outlines ten strategic recommendations, including reducing regulatory burdens, enhancing investment in emerging technologies, and fostering open digital ecosystems. Key recommendations highlighted include the need to consolidate digital legislation, promote regulatory sandboxes for startups, and prioritize capital markets union to support tech companies at various growth stages​

The event attracted a diverse array of digital policy and innovation leaders, sparking dynamic discussions on Europe’s digital priorities for 2024-2029 and reinforcing the importance of a unified digital approach for the EU’s future competitiveness. For further details on the recommendations discussed, please refer to PromethEUs Digital Blueprint 2024.

The Future of Higher Education in The Age of Artificial Intelligence

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Not only primary and secondary education but also higher education has been quite influenced by artificial intelligence (AI), and even in the academic field there are many projects and initiatives developed that could make the lives of students and professors easier.

AI Tools in university teaching and learning: the opportunities?

Nowadays, there are AI tools that provide personalized assistance to students for enrolling in faculties, or tools that help in the personalization of their academic path. Several studies have shown that personalized content improves the learning experience and leads students to achieving better results. For example, many universities around the world use Stellic, an artificial intelligence application that allows for personalized planning of degree courses and continuous monitoring of students. Thanks to Stellic, students can create “tailor-made” degree paths based on the analysis of the results of former students, so they can respect meeting graduation times and ensure successful career goals.

Moreover, AI tools can be a valuable support for students from vulnerable groups, including those with learning difficulties. The use of these tools, also in the academic context, can prevent discrimination and exclusion, ensuring that all students have equal access to technological resources. Tools such as transcription and text-to-speech systems can eliminate educational barriers by providing an environment where students with special educational needs can receive learning materials in formats that meet those needs. This inclusion allows students to express their potential without any fear of stigmatization, fostering a more equitable and empowering environment.

In addition, in the academic field but, in general at all levels of education, AI tutors are showing considerable potential in significantly increasing student engagement in various subjects, improving their outcomes. By offering personalized learning experiences, these intelligent systems adapt to the individual needs of each student, keeping them motivated. They also promote accessibility and inclusiveness, overcoming geographical and socio-economic barriers.

Many studies show that AI tutors contribute markedly to this by offering personalized feedback and instruction, which can improve learning outcomes by 20-30%.

In this regard, a study by the University of Harvard, conducted on 200 students, examined the effectiveness of a personalized AI tutor for a physics course, finding that it doubled student engagement compared to traditional teaching. The AI tutor offered personalized feedback and allowed students to learn at their own pace, greatly improving their results.

Moreover,  there are several studies that show that students who use AI systems as personalized tutors, conversing about topics and asking for explanations, benefit from their use because it facilitates learning. However, the same studies also testify that for students who rely excessively and blindly on AI, letting it solve tasks and exercises “independently” and, therefore, with less investment in sufficient mental effort, learning can be inhibited or weakened.

Finally, a further use of AI in the university environment is to collect and analyze information from the world of work and create curricula and a university course offer in line with the current needs of the labor market.

AI in education: what students think?

The Digital Education Council’s 2024 Global AI Student Survey of 3,839 responses across 16 countries, from Bachelor, Masters, and Doctorate students in multiple fields of study, reported that 86% of respondents say they use AI in their studies, primarily to research information (69%), check grammar (42%), and summarize documents (33%). Moreover, 76% of students believe that creating resumes or cover letters is one of the most promising use cases, however, tutoring systems are also perceived as particularly useful by more than half of the respondents (59%).

Despite the intensive use of AI tools, students are unsure of their literacy on the subject. In fact, 58% of the students interviewed say they do not have sufficient knowledge and skills in the field of AI, and about 70% report that the university should provide training for students and teachers on the effective use of AI tools, and for 72% universities should offer more courses on the subject. Finally, among the top concerns are data privacy and security (61%), trustworthiness of AI generated content (51%), bias and fairness in AI evaluations and decisions (32%).

Main challenges and UNESCO’s recommendations

In conclusion, these tools undoubtedly offer opportunities to support teaching, learning and assessment practices. However, their integration into the university environment, and in the education sector in general, raises concerns that refer, for example, to the unreliability of generative AI algorithms. These can produce misinformation or false results, the misuse of such technology by students, as well as the risk of plagiarism and copyright infringements, the weakening of scientific research and the limitation of critical thinking and human knowledge.  These issues need to be addressed so that technology can be used to benefit society.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), places a great deal of attention on artificial intelligence and the issues raised by the spread of its applications. For this reason in September 2023, it published the first Guide for Generative Artificial Intelligence in education and research, with the aim of helping Member States to carry out immediate actions,  plan long-term policies and ensue human-centred development of these new technologies.

The Draghi Report: On Telecoms

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Draghi (2024a, 2024b, “Draghi Report”) sets out proposals to stem the decline of EU competitiveness, focusing on three areas: closing the innovation gap with the US and China, developing a joint action plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness, and increasing security and reducing dependencies. The Report analyses 10 sectors, among which is “Digitalization and advanced technologies”, and 5 horizontal policies, including “revamping competition [policy]”. In this note, we will comment on these two in the context of the first area.

The proposed “revamping” of competition (Section 2, Chapter 4) involves the adoption of 10 measures, some of which advocate to shift the focus of competition enforcement from the short-run effects on consumers (essentially, prices) to a forward-looking assessment that also takes into account “the weight of innovation and future competition” (Measure 1) and “security and resilience criteria” (Measure 3), benefiting consumers by making new technologies available and increasing security. Measure 8 is to “Reinforce ex-post versus ex-ante regulation and monitoring”, while Measure 9 advances to “Introduce a ‘New Competition Tool’ (NCT) in four areas”. Together with Measure 10 “Accelerate the decision-making processes and increase the predictability of decisions”, these proposals are more controversial, in that they propose to deviate from the recent path of competition enforcement.

The other measures imply a strengthening or widening of existing provisions: “Provide clear guidance and templates on novel agreements, coordination and co-deployment between competitors” (Measure 2), “Apply effectively the new powers associated with the enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)” (Measure 7), and “Incentivising the adoption of open access, interoperability, and adherence to EU standards through State aid and other competition tools” (Measure 6) deal with applying existing rules about the evaluation of agreements and exercise of market power. Measures 4 “State aid control as a competition tool for efficiency enhancing industrial policies” and 5 “Reform and expand [] Important Projects of Common European Interest” refer to the strategic use of State Aid policies, deploying them in a coordinated manner instead of creating subsidy races.

The perceived necessity and implications of these measures are set out in clear terms for the telecoms sector:

“A key reason for lower rates of investment is Europe’s fragmented market. For example, there are 34 mobile network operator groups in the EU and only a handful in the US or China, in part because the EU and Member States have tended to view mergers in the sector negatively. This fragmentation makes the fixed costs of investing in networks relatively more onerous for EU operators than for continent-scale companies in the US or China. “ (2024a, p. 27)

“Facilitating consolidation in the telecoms sector is needed to deliver higher rates of investment in connectivity […]. The cornerstone initiative is modifying the EU’s stance towards scale and consolidation of telecoms operators to deliver a true Single Market, without sacrificing consumer welfare and quality of service. To encourage consolidation, the report recommends defining telecoms markets at the EU level – as opposed to the Member State level – and increasing the weight of innovation and investment commitments in the EU’s rules for clearing mergers. Country-level ex ante regulation should be reduced in favour of ex post competition enforcement in cases of abuse of dominant position. …” (2024a, p. 31; what follows mentions the important topics of harmonization of spectrum licensing, adoption of pan-EU standards, and investment sharing with Very Large Online Platforms, which we do not have space to discuss here).

These proposals are consistent with the Letta (2024) Report (on which I commented in a previous PromethEUs blog post), in that they agree on consolidation. But it would be wrong to see these proposals as a means to achieve the “sufficient scale to compete with Chinese and American superstar companies” mentioned by Draghi as one of the reasons for the competition policy revamp: As much as Verizon in the US does not compete with China Telecom, so Telefonica does not compete with either: Competition in mobile and fixed telecommunications is local. Competitiveness in international markets only matters where markets are, um, international.

Mobile and fixed networks are local. Any operator who wants to offer services in a certain area either needs to have a network in place or a network usage agreement with someone who does. Consolidation between operators, be it at national or EU level, does not change this basic fact. Thus consolidation in the telecoms sector does not lead to scale gains in the sense that the same network (say, a Belgian one) can serve many more customers (say, in Germany as well).

It is telling that an operator such as Vodafone has thrown in the towel after trying for two decades to build a pan-European presence: It had to realize that under existing conditions there is no strategic value as such in being present in many EU countries, nor has it been able to provide services to final customers that meaningfully leverage its pan-European scale.

Draghi proposes to redefine telecoms markets at the EU instead of the national level. This proposal is not viable in the short run, to start with because if it were put into practice quickly, even the largest operators in the EU would have to be considered competitive minnows, and ex-ante regulation based on Significant Market Power (SMP) would become void at once. On the other hand, the proposal of EU-level market definition makes sense as a last step in a drawn-out process that first removes the obstacles that make cross-country operators optimally treat each country as a separate market. Unfortunately, this may not be possible as long as income disparities between countries remain at the current levels – it makes little sense to charge the same prices in Germany and Portugal – average incomes are a third in the latter country.

One might argue that the necessary gains in scale are achieved precisely if operators in the same country merge: More customers will be served by the same network (at least when the next generation of technology is rolled out, such as Gigabit fibre networks). Here the argument brought forth is that the unavoidable direct loss in competitive intensity will be compensated by a faster and more innovative roll-out (see Measure 1). But the question that should be raised here is whether the same result could be obtained by means which involve fewer negative side effects. Indeed, “Measure 2” about co-deployment goes exactly in this direction. Though the empirical judgement on the risks (potential for collusion) of such agreements is still forthcoming, at least the benefits are clear. Having clear rules at the EU level about the necessary safeguards and unacceptable clauses would make such agreements more attractive and, most importantly, safer and faster to implement.

Measure 8 (reinforce ex-post versus ex-ante regulation) curiously gets the story backwards: It seems to argue for more ex-post enforcement (based on a new obligation on certain companies to report certain information) instead of ex-ante rules, based on the argument that DG Comp is overwhelmed by its new responsibilities. Here it might be useful to remember that the new ex-ante frameworks (DMA, DSA, AI Act, plus the EECC) have been put in place precisely because authorities are not able to follow up on potential violations of competition rules in reasonable time or at all, due to their inherently limited means. What is really being proposed here is that decisions in competition cases (abuses or mergers) are followed by close monitoring, which should increase rather than decrease workload. Also, read in the context of the telecoms sector, this proposal has quite a different meaning from what will easily be read into the above citation, which is a removal of the last remaining “relevant markets” under the EECC in its upcoming revision.

Summing up, the recommendations of the Draghi report for the telecoms sector should have been better thought through: The order and timeline of their implementation are essential, the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative measures, as well as those of ex-ante versus ex-post interventions, should have received more attention.

References:

Draghi, M. (2024a). The future of European competitiveness: Part A | A competitiveness strategy for Europe, September. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en

Draghi, M. (2024b). The future of European competitiveness: Part B | In-depth analysis and recommendations, September. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en

Letta, E. (2024). Much more than a market: speed, security, solidarity: Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens, April. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf

Cybersecurity as the Backbone of the European Industrial Strategy and Technological Competitiveness

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The EU’s Industrial Strategy in the Age of Technological Competition
Set against the backdrop of an increasingly competitive world, the European Union’s Industrial Strategy aims to bolster its technological and strategic autonomy. The strategy emphasises resilience in key sectors such as energy, manufacturing, and digital infrastructure, and seeks to reduce reliance on external actors for critical technologies. As part of this vision for future European competitiveness, cybersecurity emerges as a key pillar for safeguarding innovation and allowing European industries to be competitive globally without being vulnerable to external influence. To ensure a competitive industrial strategy, it is crucial to have a robust cybersecurity in place for European industry and digital services.

The Rise of Cyber Threats in a Competitive Global Market
Europe is facing a growing tide of cyber threats which is being continuously amplified by the digitalisation of critical infrastructure and production processes. Julian Lepassaar, head of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) stated that the amount of disruptive cyber-attacks have doubled from the fourth quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024. Sectors such as energy, manufacturing, healthcare, and finance are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber-attacks. These threats pose significant risks and can cripple industrial competitiveness and disrupt essential services. The EU recognises these vulnerabilities as being critical to address, especially in its goal of achieving digital sovereignty. To tackle this, the NIS2 Directive (Network and Information Security Directive 2), a cornerstone of the EU’s strategy to fortify its internal digital defences, was adopted in November 2022, and entered into force January 16th 2023. The directive seeks to mandate higher standards of cybersecurity across essential sectors. Thereby, it aims to increase the resilience of EU industries and ensure the safety of digital and operational technologies. This is key to maintaining the future economic strength of Europe. Despite having sought to respond to the rise of cyber threats and an increasingly competitive market, the EU still falls short on preventive measures against these threats and on reducing its reliance on foreign powers and technologies. While there have been recent strides in outlining strategies for enhancing European competitiveness, cybersecurity remains a critical area that demands further decisive and coordinated action for long-term resilience and autonomy.

Cybersecurity Enables Industrial Innovation
Cybersecurity is more than mere defensive measures. In the realm of industrial innovation, it also acts as an enabler. For instance, in the context of Industry 4.0, which includes the integration of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), and 5G. Robust cybersecurity allows European industries to fully harness these advanced technologies. Without sufficient cybersecurity measures, the risks associated with these measures such as data breaches and network vulnerabilities can limit their adoption and effectiveness. This is because, whilst these technologies enhance innovation and productivity, they also increase entry points for cyber-attacks, making it paramount to secure these systems. Trustworthy and proficient cybersecurity mechanisms can allow European industries to fully harness these advanced technologies. This is particularly important in competitive sectors such as aerospace, automotive, and pharmaceutical, and especially in developing emerging technologies. In these sectors, intellectual property theft can severely undermine a company’s competitive advantage. Cybersecurity was not given a dedicated section in Mario Draghi’s report on The Future of European Competitiveness. However, it plays a prominent role in nearly every sector discussed from clean energy to defence. The report calls for streamlined cybersecurity standards, stronger cross-border cooperation, and addressing the skills gap. Strengthening cybersecurity is not only a protective measure, but also a key driver to Europe’s competitiveness and its ambition to lead in advanced technologies.

Fostering Homegrown Cybersecurity Solutions
The EU Industrial Strategy stresses the importance of reducing dependency on foreign technologies, particularly from the United States and China, which dominate the global cybersecurity landscape. As Enrico Letta highlights in his report on the Future of the Single Market, achieving strategic autonomy is critical to ensuring Europe’s competitiveness on the global stage. Seeking to achieve technological sovereignty, the EU has made investments in cultivating homegrown cybersecurity solutions. Initiatives such as the Digital Europe Programme and the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre aim to promote the development of European cybersecurity firms. It is essential to foster innovation and self-reliance in the critical field of cybersecurity. Public-private partnerships will play a growing vital role in achieving these objectives. By encouraging collaboration between governments, industry leaders and academia, the EU can nurture a robust cybersecurity ecosystem that not only secures its industries but also contributes to its global competitiveness. A deeper integration within the Single Market as Letta has called for, is pertinent in this context. It is necessary to reduce fragmentation across member states and promote cross-border cooperation to avoid duplicated efforts and inefficiencies that have previously hampered Europe’s progress in scaling up cybersecurity firms. Additionally, Europe lags in developing cutting-edge technologies such as AI-driven cybersecurity and quantum computing security. There is a lack of R&D investment compared to global competitors, leaving gaps in innovation. Several firms continue to rely on hardware and software from non-EU countries, hindering the EU’s goal of achieving technological sovereignty. Increased investment in R&D and cybersecurity start-ups, alongside frameworks that support small and medium enterprises (SMEs), will be key to building a globally competitive cybersecurity ecosystem capable of ensuring Europe’s digital resilience.

In conclusion, robust cybersecurity is fundamental to the EU’s goal of enhancing its technological and industrial competitiveness. Furthermore, by strengthening its internal defences and fostering homegrown innovation, the EU can protect its industries from the increasing threat of cyberattacks. Harmonising efforts across member states is essential to create a cohesive and resilient cybersecurity framework. However, regulations and frameworks need to be fit for purpose and be able to evolve alongside the advancement of emerging technologies. Public-private partnerships will play a key role in driving innovation and scaling up cybersecurity solutions, such as those facilitated by the European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO). However, to enable European cybersecurity firms to scale and compete globally, fragmented regulations and limited access to venture capital must be addressed. Ultimately, cybersecurity will not only protect Europe’s industrial base but also enhance its ability to innovate and compete on the global stage, independent of external powers. By addressing these challenges, Europe can strengthen its industrial competitiveness and secure its place in an increasingly interconnected but vulnerable digital world.

Generative AI and Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities

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The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) of Lisbon, one of the think tanks of the PromethEUs network, has recently published its report “Generative AI and Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities”.

With the advent of Generative AI (GenAI), many sectors of society started adopting tools such as ChatGPT and Microsoft Copilot to maximise the benefits that arise from their use. One of the examples is higher education, where GenAI quickly demonstrated its potential to enhance learning, with tools that stem from helping students summarize materials to assisting teachers in class preparation and grading.

However, benefits do not come without potential threats. In the past years, international organisations like the European Union and the OECD tried to establish a regulatory framework which emphasises the ethical use of AI and core values such as transparency, data privacy, and maintaining human agency in education. The general idea behind the frameworks is to guard the citizens against the misuse of AI, while still trying to leverage its potential to improve education.

IPP’s report examines the impact of GenAI on three main areas: educators, students, and higher education institutions. It addresses the opportunities and risks GenAI presents, noting challenges such as plagiarism and academic integrity. Key questions are raised regarding the role of educators, the future of assessments, the introduction of AI literacy, and how to promote ethical use of AI in education.

Click here to read the report by IPP’s researchers Steffen Hoernig, Paulo Trigo Pereira, André Ilharco and Regina Pereira:

https://www.ipp-jcs.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Report-AI-in-Higher-Education-IPP-1.pdf

The revival of industrial policy in the EU and its potential for the digital transformation of the Greek economy

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Industrial policy is back in fashion on the European economic policy agenda. Of course, this is not something completely new. Since the Great Recession of 2008, the European Commission (EC) has openly supported coordinated and complementary policies as an effort to tackle structural deficiencies. However, it was the European Grean Deal[1] that labeled these targeted efforts as industrial strategies, bringing forward sustainable development as the ultimate goal of European economic policy.

In this context, a New Industrial Strategy[2] was devised in 2020 to guide the continent’s green and digital -or twin– transition, with specific policy priorities such as maintaining global competitiveness, achieving climate neutrality by 2050, and shaping Europe’s digital future. This action plan was never truly tested, as the COVID-19 pandemic came to revamp the European economy, leading to a direct update of the EU’s industrial strategy in 2021[3] in a strategic document that still guides EU and member-states’ policymaking efforts. The update placed the EU’s “open strategic autonomy” at the epicenter and proposed a set of actions along three key axes: i) strengthening the resilience of the European Single Market, ii) strengthening of the EU’s strategic autonomy, and iii) accelerating the twin transition. In addition, it highlighted key industrial ecosystems and proposed tailor-made policy toolboxes and industrial alliances to support them. To achieve the ambitious goal set by its updated industrial strategy, the EC directed funds from flagship programs, including inter alia, InvestEU, NextGenerationEU and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) instrument, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027, and Horizon Europe.

However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war produced one of the largest energy crises the continent has ever faced. The EU’s response came in the form of the Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age[4] in 2023, which seeks to ensure that the Green Deal’s ambitious goals remain on track with the recent geopolitical developments. The new industrial plan and its flagship initiatives, such as the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act, aim to speed up Europe’s progress to climate neutrality by fostering the development of a simplified and predictable regulatory framework, enabling faster access to funds, supporting up-skilling and re-skilling initiatives, and implementing actions that enhance the resilience of the EU’s supply chains through open trade.

These strategic documents caused a chain-reaction in the EU member-states, including Greece. High public-private debt and large fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits -the same problems that led Greece in a decade-long recession (2008-2018)- are still present, rooted in the lack of structural reforms implemented in the country. Following the direction set by the EC, the country presented in 2022 a strategic document titled National Industrial Strategy and Action Plan[5], outlining a vision where the Greek industry can act as the transformative factor of the economy through innovation, international cooperation, and human capital development. The document provided a roadmap of 43 interventions along key strategic areas. Among those areas, the digital transformation of the Greek business economy is a focal point, as the strategy aims to promote the digitalization of industrial firms, the adoption of cutting-edge digital techs, and the upgrading of digital infrastructure.

Greece’s digital transformation in all fronts, both public and private, has been a pressing issue. Coming off from the 2008-2018 economic crisis, the country ranked in the last place (28th) on the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) for 2018, with particular problems in digital readiness. Since 2019, Greece has made significant progress in all four pillars of the DESI, including digital skills, digital infrastructure, digital transformation of businesses and, above all, the digitalization of public services during the pandemic.[6] For the public sector, the country devised one of its very first concrete strategy documents, the Bible of the Digital Transformation 2020-2025[7], and pledged significant funds from its Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) to its digital transition and to achieving the EU’s ambitious Digital Decade targets. For the private sector, the country published in 2021 a National Strategy for the Digital Transformation of the Greek Industry[8] to address the deficiencies in the country’s business sector digital infrastructure and workforce skills. The document is aligned to the country’s national industrial strategy and provides guidelines, objectives, and an action plan to achieve them.

Both these documents are part of an extensive body of strategic directions, action plans, initiatives, and reforms which constitute the current Greek industrial policy landscape. The timing of these documents is critical. On the one hand, extreme global challenges are already putting the structurally deficient Greek productive model under immense pressure, demanding an immediate strategic response. On the other hand, the EU’s shift towards active engagement and, most importantly, the direct financial stimulation of industrial competitiveness presents an unprecedented opportunity for restructuring the Greek productive model. However, for Greece to meet its transformative potential, the country must be continuously engaged in a path of dynamic policy interventions.

A major challenge for the country is to successfully utilize an unprecedented wealth of EU and state financing tools—including the RRF, the MFF 2021–2027, Horizon Europe, the new development law (Law 4887/2022), and additional funds made available by the various Commission Acts. It is also critical that the pool of financial resources is allocated efficiently and transparently in the Greek economy. For instance, the funds made available by the RRF and the MFF 2021–2027 targeting the digital and green transitions, the re-skilling and upskilling of the Greek labor force, and the development of proper infrastructure across multiple sectors, provide significant transformative potential and can create a horizontal boost for economic and industrial activity. These tools must be put to “good use”, meaning they should seek to benefit everyone and not just selected ecosystems or sectors.

The EU has already transitioned into a decade of industrial policy revival with significant transformative potential for all its members, including Greece. While the country has quickly adjusted to the new status quo with multiple strategic documents that aim to advance its digital and technological capabilities, it must also recognize the fact that strategic planning is not enough. Greece must meet the challenge of implementing its ambitious action plans while constantly monitoring, evaluating and updating (if necessary) its strategic orientation against the volatility of the current global market environment. In this context, the need emerges for a holistic industrial policy approach in the years ahead, in which different strategies related to the industry, the digital transformation, the green transition and other current major challenges are integrated into a unified system of policies that can provide the solid foundations for the pursuit of sustainable growth and competitiveness by the Greek industry in the long term.

 

Note: This article draws from an extensive policy brief entitled “Leveraging EU industrial policy to reshape Greece’s productive model” and can be found here

 

 

 

[1] COM(2019)640

[2] COM(2020)102

[3] COM(2021)350

[4] COM(2023)062

[5] https://www.mindev.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2.-Εθνική-Στρατηγική-Βιομηχανίας-και-Σχέδιο-Δράσης-National-Industrial-Strategy-and-Action-Plan.pdf

[6] For more information on the country’s DESI 2023 rankings, see here.

[7] https://digitalstrategy.gov.gr/en/

[8] https://www.ggb.gr/el/node/1820

Did someone say “Consolidation”?

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Enrico Letta published his keenly awaited report[1] in April 2024, outlining how European competitiveness could be improved by a series of measures intended to complete the Single Market. In particular, he pointed to the fact that until now the finance, energy, and electronic communications sectors had not been included in the construction of the Single Market:

“Three decades ago, when the Single Market was established, these sectors were intentionally excluded from its scope, deemed too strategic to be integrated beyond the national level. However, the perspective that once prioritised domestic control is now proving to be a barrier to the growth and competitiveness of these sectors at the European level and globally.” (p.51)

Why does this matter now?

“The lack of integration in the financial, energy, and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness.” (p.8)

The problem is precisely that these sectors provide the basic inputs for most of the functioning of the European economy. And so, he made proposals for creating a Single Market also in these sectors. While all three are important, news headlines tended to focus on national consolidation in the telecoms sector. Some were simplistic:

  • Bloomberg, 16 April 2024: “EU Report Backs Telecom Consolidation, Strong Energy Market”[2]
  • Euractiv, 17 April 2024, “Letta’s report aligns with views of major telecoms on market integration”[3].

Others were more thoughtful or pointed straight at the mistake of not thinking this through:

  • Sandbu, 21 April 2024, “Europe still fails to make enough of its size — here’s how to fix that”[4]
  • von Thun, 5 June 2024. “Competition, Not Consolidation, Is the Key to a Resilient and Innovative Europe”[5]

So, what did Letta actually write?

In his report, Letta stated that the European telecoms market is highly fragmented, with more than 100 operators (p.52) in 27 EU countries. While this corresponds to three operators per country on average, which from a competition policy point of view is already a small number for healthy competition to arise, this corresponds to an average number of 5 million customers per operator, as opposed to 107 million customers in the US and 467 million in China (p.52). The conclusion is that European operators lack scale, which involves lower bargaining power with suppliers and gatekeeper platforms and lower returns from investments into research and innovation and the core infrastructure.

Add to this those national markets themselves are small, with

“multiple operators offering commoditized communication services characterised by low levels of diversification. Consequently, insufficient value creation occurs within these national markets depressing the investment in advanced networks which are essential for a competitive economic landscape.” (p.55).

Thus, Letta’s conclusion is

“Given this scenario, the mere establishment of a Single Market would not yield a discernibly different outcome unless it facilitates the growth of operators. Such growth is imperative to achieve economies of scale and scope, enabling cost reduction and fostering innovation.” (p.55)

And here comes the decisive paragraph, which for clearness we reproduce in its entirety:

“As markets still remain primarily national, cross-border consolidation could involve domestic markets making sure that competition law is respected. This must be viewed as a step in the development of European dimension cross-border operators. Establishing a Single Market for electronic communications with European operators capable of a global role is an objective which is not in contrast with the objective of keeping markets open and competitive. The scale of investments necessary in new technologies (for example edge/cloud, 6G, AI) implies that due consideration should be given to the necessity of some level of consolidation within national markets or strategic alliances between market players including pro-competitive sharing of investments in key network elements.” (p.55) [our highlighting]

This paragraph leaves no doubt that what Letta proposes is to create the conditions for successful cross-border operators with a European dimension, starting with regulatory governance: “…the fragmentation of how common rules are implemented in each domestic market hinders the ability of operators to penetrate other EU markets…” (p.56). But he pointed out before that

“Establishing an effective Electronic Communications Networks and Services can help to fix many of the current failures in a way that remains coherent with European values, and citizens’ rights and market economy principles. The process to get there is complex and a progressive approach is preferable: it has to be unrolled along some key issues.” (p.53)

The top key issue is consumer welfare, followed by infrastructure and services – not the other way round; that is, clearly, he sees national (as opposed to cross-border) consolidation either as a necessary bad, to be compensated by stronger competition from cross-border competitors, or as an option to be compared to allowing pro-competitive sharing of network investment.

Nothing is better than to have the author explain his report. A VoxEU/CEPR seminar on June 3rd, 2024, provided the opportunity.[6] There Letta said that Europe first needed to create a single market in electronic communications, starting with the key issue of radio spectrum integration, to be followed by the redefinition of the relevant markets at EU level. Then a process of consolidation can take place, towards a midway point between the present EU scenario and the US market outcome with only three continental operators.

What is the market reality?

The realities on the ground are a bit muddied, and presently we are seeing some contrasting movements. To start with, a few years back, before the tight regulation of EU call and data roaming prices and the appearance of OTTs, there was a pan-European business model based on frequent travellers and businesses, through offers of lower charges for international and roaming calls and data, the prime example being Vodafone. This business model was actually based on the market distortions created by excessively high wholesale and retail prices for international and roaming calls and duly faded away with the Roaming Regulation and wide OTT usage.

On the other hand, retail demand is fundamentally local: Purchasing power (average wages are three times higher in Germany than in Portugal, for example) and cultural traits vary strongly, and competitors vary. Thus, retail offers must be tailored to local conditions, and on the retail demand side there do not seem to be any benefits for pan-European operators.

Maybe not by chance what we have observed in recent years is consolidation at national level and deconsolidation at EU level: Deutsche Telekom and Orange merged in the UK, then sold out to BT; the challenger Hutchison merged its business in Italy, Ireland, Austria, and is now attempting to merge with Vodafone in the UK. Vodafone on the other hand is retrenching and just sold its Italian and Spanish units, i.e., its businesses in two of the largest EU states. Orange just merged with MásMóvil in Spain, etc.

A closer analysis of these cases may support the conclusions of Letta’s report – or may not. Is it a question of these markets being too small, or being too competitive? If an EU-sized market were even more competitive, what would the outcome be? In the end, operators might prefer cosy national markets, especially if they are allowed to merge.

There are some indications of movements in the opposite direction, of course. To start with, several tower companies have been buying up mobile operators’ towers, building up a trans-EU presence. Either this is a sign of significant returns to scale at infrastructure holding level that were waiting to be materialized, or it is the outcome of a financial bubble created by low interest rates and operators need for liquidity that has now burst.

Finally, new operators keep coming, though they are few. Free/Iliad, a French company, now also operates in Italy, Ireland, and Poland, though in the latter two markets it entered though acquisitions. Digi, a Romanian company, entered Spain and Italy and is preparing its launch in Portugal and Belgium, having announced that they would not copy the existing operators’ business model. Clearly, some operators continue to see cross-border opportunities — the game continues.

[1] Enrico Letta, “Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens,” April 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-16/eu-report-calls-for-telecom-consolidation-strong-energy-market

[3] https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/lettas-report-aligns-with-views-of-major-telecoms-on-market-integration/

[4] https://www.ft.com/content/f6200dc5-e42b-4356-9951-70ca3a94cd0a

[5] https://www.promarket.org/2024/06/05/competition-not-consolidation-is-the-key-to-a-resilient-and-innovative-europe/

[6] “Competition Policy RPN – New Industrial Policy, Competitiveness, Competition: Framing the Trade-Offs,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIduIUOILAY.

The role of Artificial Intelligence in the tourism sector

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Artificial intelligence is already opening up new opportunities in the tourism industry, and major players are eager to experiment with ChatGPT and other forms of generative AI to offer tailored services to their customers and make the travel experience easier and more exciting.

Artificial Intelligence in the EU accomodation market

According to the European Accomodation Barometer Fall 2023 published by Statista in collaboration with Booking, Austria was the European country with the highest share of accommodation businesses (44%) that considered AI as a key opportunity over the next six months. Just 13% of the sample in Greece and 16% in France believed the same. The EU average stood at 23%.

Accommodations that considered AI as a key opportunity in Europe, by country (% of respondents, 2023)

In the EU, Germany held the highest share of accommodation businesses that already used AI. Overall, 2 out of the 10 German surveyed companies reported using AI, whereas in Italy and Spain only 8% and 4%, respectively.

Customer chatbots (58%) and dynamic pricing (52%) are the most popular applications of accommodation businesses in the EU, followed by customer review management (47%) and content marketing (45%).

Use of AI by accommodation businesses in Europe, by country (% of respondents, Aug 2023)

Use cases and opportunities of generative AI in the tourism sector

Therefore, artificial intelligence, and especially generative AI, is emerging as a revolutionary technology that is reshaping the travel and tourism landscape in Europe and in the rest of the world.

Tourism companies are now making a lot of investments in these technologies to gain a competitive edge and to create new opportunities in terms of enhancing customer experiences, efficient content generation, streamlining customer support, and optimizing marketing strategies.

For example, airlines and travel agencies are leveraging generative AI to create virtual travel assistants that can assist customers with booking flights, hotels and activities, making the booking process more convenient and user-friendly, and enhancing customer satisfaction. Moreover, online travel platforms are using Generative AI to offer personalized travel recommendations. By analyzing user preferences and historical data, these platforms suggest destinations, accommodations, and activities tailored to individual traveller tastes, enhancing the overall travel experience.

Finally, hotels and airlines are utilizing generative AI to optimize pricing strategies. These models analyze demand patterns, competitor pricing, and other factors in real-time to adjust prices dynamically, maximizing revenue while ensuring competitiveness.

Generative AI in the tourism market

Given the growing interest in generative artificial intelligence, tourism has been witnessing a significant market growth in recent years, and lucrative growth prospects are expected throughout the forecast period. Specifically, the size of generative AI in the tourism market was globally valued at $3647.43 million in 2023, and the total generative AI in tourism revenue is expected to grow at a CAGR of 17.5% from 2024 to 2030, reaching by the end of the current decade an estimated value of $11278.53 million.

 Challenges in implementing AI in the tourism sector

However, the integration of AI in the tourism sector is not without challenges. Concerns about data privacy, security and ethical use of AI are critical issues. Compliance with data protection regulation is essential. Organizations must implement stringent security measures to safeguard sensitive data from unauthorized access, breaches, or cyber threats.

Training and upskilling professionals in the sector to effectively use and manage AI tools is another critical challenge. Ongoing training programs are essential to keep tourism professionals abreast of the evolving capabilities of AI and to ensure they can leverage these technologies to enhance their roles.

Finally, the availability and quality of data is a key factor in enabling such technologies. Inaccurate or incomplete data can compromise the effectiveness of AI algorithms, leading to erroneous conclusions and decisions. Addressing these issues requires a robust data governance framework, data validation processes, and continuous monitoring to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data used by AI systems.